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INTRODUCTION AND SuMmy 
It is the element of conflict and cooperation which lies at the root of game 
theory and distinguishes differential games from control theory. Rufus 
Isaacs focused attention upon these problems with the publication of his book 
Differential Games [5] in 1965 and recently mathematicians have been stu- 
dying a wide variety of problems in this area [l-4, 8, 91. 
Most investigations have concentrated their efforts upon two person games 
of the pursuit-evasion type and upon zero-sum games in which one player 
tries to minimize a prescribed cost functional while the other plays so as to 
maximize the functional. Although considerable progress has been made on 
two person games the theory is nowhere near completion. In this paper we 
study an n-person nonzero-sum game which belongs to a class for which 
few results are known. 
In the games considered here, each player selects a cost functional which 
measures his lack of success in a play of the game and tries to minimize that 
cost. This leads to the definition of an equilibrium strategy whose existence, 
uniqueness, stability and synthesis are studied in this paper. 
Since differential games cover control theory as the special case of a one 
player game it is not surprising that along with an enrichment of phenomena 
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Science Foundation under Grant No. G. P. 11495. 
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it inherits all the difficulties of control-and more. Evidence to this effect is 
given by the example of a nonplayable game presented in Section 2. The prob- 
lem shows up as the singularity of the decision operator defined in Section 1. 
Nevertheless, many of the differential games studied here, with linear dyna- 
mics and quadratic costs, do possess an equilibrium and this extended concept 
of a minimum can be analyzed in some detail. 
In Section I the existence and uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium strate- 
gies is analyzed in a Hilbert space setting where the concept of a playable 
game is most easily abstracted. Various sufficiency conditions for playability 
are derived in Section 2 and in Section 3 the important idea of a stable 
equilibrium is developed. 
Beginning with Section 4 we study differential games. These concrete 
problems give rise to spaces H, H, , Hz ,..,, H, of infinite dimension, thus 
accounting for the generality of our treatment. All the differential games con- 
sidered are shown to be stable, and hence playable, over sufficiently short 
time intervals. A Hamilton- Jacobi approach is developed to prove the import- 
ant fact that the open-loop equilibrium strategies of a playable game can be 
synthesized by feedback control functions and consequently an efficient means 
is found for computing the strategies in terms of the state of the game. 
Notation. We employ notation and its abuses common in functional 
analysis. For the inner product of two vectors x and y we use x * y in finite 
dimensional real number spaces Rk and (x, y) in real Hilbert spaces H, HI , 
II H,, 2 ,..-, etc. The induced norm is written as 1 x 1 and the norm of a real 
matrix or bounded operator B is defined by 11 B 1) = s~p~~~,r j Bx /. B* 
denotes the transposed matrix or adjoint operator. The notation W 3 0 
(W > 0) means W is a symmetric positive semi-definite (definite) matrix, i.e. 
x * WX > 0 (X . WX > 0) for all vectors x f 0. We also use the convenient 
notation 1 x 12w = x * Wx with similar notations when W is a bounded self- 
adjoint operator. To the extent that it is convenient we use Latin script 
g’i ) 9, 9, @i ) %q )... for operators and Latin letters Bi , A, Ui , Wi ,... 
for matrices. Ii denotes the identity operators on the ith space. 
1. n-PERSON GAMES IN A HILBERT SPACE 
Let H, Hl , H, ,..., H,, be real Hilbert spaces. We consider a process 
x=x,+~‘,u,+~2U2+...+~‘nU, (1.1) 
where the state of the game x and the initial state x0 lie in H, uI E Hi , and 
C%i denotes a bounded linear transformation 
LA?~:H,-~H (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). (1.2) 
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It is assumed that the control vector (strategy) ui can be chosen at will by a 
player whom we shall call Pi . Each player Pi has, as his objective, the mini- 
mization of a certain quadratic cost functional of x and ui , 
cj = ( x - %j I$, + j Ui I$/# e U-3) 
Here the target vectors Z~ E H, the bounded linear operators 7(u > 0 on H 
and %i > 0 on Hi are given (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). 
Since x is given by (1. l), (1.3) becomes 
If the strategies u1 , us ,..., ui-i , u~+~ ,..., ZJ~ are fixed, then a simple completion 
of squares shows that the minimizing a, is the unique value of ud at which the 
Frechet derivative with respect to ui of the expression in (1.4) is zero. Thus 
iii satisfies 
(aj*X, Uj) = (X, BiUj), xEH, UiEHi. U.6) 
Since G?YYd + .%9i*9’$@i > 0, the optimal strategy zZi is uniquely determined if 
the other strategies ul , us ,..., uiml , ui+r ,..., u, are known. 
The most important question in the theory of games is: Is it possible for all 
players to play optimal strategies imultaneously ? Such a n-tuple of strategies 
4 , &. ,***, a, is called an equilibrium strategy and is defined by the inequalities 
~@I > 6 ,‘.., %> ,< pi@, , d, ,*a*, 4-1, Ut , &+I ,*-*, ii,) (1.7) 
for all uk E Hi , (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). It is evidently true that there is an equilibrium 
strategy if the equations 
~j*W@& + Bj*W@$tl~ + “. + (%i + gj*?Y@j) dj + *‘* + LZj*W@fiti* 
= aj*Yqq - x0), (i = 1, 2,..., n) G-8) 
are uniquely solvable. We are thus led to investigate the properties of a linear 
operator 
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which is given as a matrix of operators: 
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(1.10) 
where 
9’/ = diag.[%r , es ,..., a,,] 9 = diag.[@ , aa ,..., L&‘,J 
We will refer to CS as the decision operator for the game in question. When 9 
is nonsingular the system (1.8) has a unique n-tuple 21, &a ,..., zi, of solution 
vectors and we will say that the game is playable. If 9 is singular we will say 
that the game is not playable. 
Our first task then, will be to investigate the playability of the game by 
determining whether the decision operator 9 is nonsingular. This problem is 
treated in Section 2. 
Another question which arises is the stability of the game. It is clear from 
(1.5) that unless the player Pi knows the strategies ur , us ,..., ui-r , ui+r ,..., u, 
to be used by the other players, or at least appropriate related information, 
he can not determine his own optimal strategy Qi . Typically, then, the strategy 
selection will proceed through a sequence of adjustments. The players choose 
initial strategies Or, , tiaa ,..., z&s which become known to all players. Based 
upon these strategies each player readjusts his strategy according to some 
systematic procedure, seeking to lower his cost, and thereby new strategies 
1 I* url , z+ ,..., a,, are determined. We assume that Pi is ignorant of or else 
ignores the procedures used by the other players for readjusting their strate- 
gies and acts via (1.5) in a manner which would give the greatest reduction in 
his cost if the other players repeated their strategies used in the previous stage. 
That is, in general the strategies &, & ,..., Gnnk are determined from 
%k-1 3 uZ.k-1 Y**., %.k-1 b y 
which, in matrix-vector form, becomes 
[‘@ + a* d.(w) =%?I ii, + g*[w - d.(?V-)] @f&-r = L%* d.(%‘-) f (1.12) 
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with the notation 
&=[sf), %=fit) and d.(%‘)=diag.[“tY;,K ,..., %Q. 
This is a recurrence equation whose solution will converge to the unique 
solution of (1.8) if the operator 
Y = [92 + 9* d.(%‘-) k%j-’ 9*[9K - d.(w)] g 
has the property 
II 9 II < 1 
(1.13) 
(1.14) 
or, when HI , Hz ,..., H,, are finite dimensional, if all eigenvalues A of 9’ 
satisfy 
Ih]<l. (1.15) 
Notice that each n-tuple (Fr , Ya ,.,., &) of bounded, nonsingular, linear 
transformations 
q:Hi+Hi (1.16) 
induces, through (1.1) and (1.3), a similarity transformation on 9. It follows 
that if (1.14) or (1.15) hold after some appropriate change of control variables 
(1.16) then every solution z2, of (1.12) will converge to the unique equilibrium 
strategy as k -+ CO and it is for this reason we call such games stable. 
This concept of stability is particularly useful since many important 
games (hopefully the arms race, e.g.) are never actually played out. Rather, 
the players continually determine new strategies based upon information 
concerning the current strategies of the other players. 
We close this section by pointing out that playability as well as stability 
is invariant under a change of control variables of type (1.16) since it induces a 
congruence transformation on 9. Both Z@ and 9’ are independent of trans- 
lations and nonsingular linear transformations of state. Consequently in the 
next section we need not worry about stating sufficiency conditions for 
playability or stability in coordinate systems which are special. 
2. PLAYABILITY 
In this section we study the possibility of inverting the decision operator 
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on HI @ H, @ *-- @ H, defined by (1.10) where in 
Y& > 0 on Hand where in 9 = diag.[%i , %a ,..., en] we continue to assume 
ai > 0 on Hi (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). 
It is tempting to speculate that under these conditions 9 is always non- 
singular and hence that the game is playable. The following example shows 
this is false. 
EXAMPLE 1. 9 may be singular even if wi > 0 and @‘i > 0 
(i = 1, 2 ,..., n). 
Proof. We take n = 2, H = R2, HI = Hz = R1 and 
(2.2) 
q=?%z=c, c a positive scalar, (2.3) 
Then 
c3 = 6 2 + 6 :, x 3 
=(g3 $). 
The determinant of this matrix is 
,2,79c2!5 
5 5 
(2.4) 
(24 
(24 
which vanishes for c = c, , where 
79 -- 
5 
+ ($,“+4.7 
d co = 
2 > 0, 
and thus, by example, we have shown that 9 may be singular. 
(2.7) 
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We now present sufficient conditions for the nonsingularity of 9. You 
might say we are studying a control problem at another level of abstraction 
where in (2.1) we steer with 4, L% and ‘V and the target is the set of invertible 
operators. (Similarly for the problem of stability we control (1.13) and the 
target is the set of contraction operators.) Our first theorem shows w can 
exert a strong influence upon the nonsingularity of 9. 
THEOREM 1. If there is an operator W0 > 0 and positive constants p1 , 
p2 ,..., pS such that 
~ = aims (i = 1, 2,..., n) (2.8) 
then 9 is nonsingular. 
Proof. Since w0 > 0 it has a square root wiJ” > 0 and using (2.8) we 
compute 
.Q = diag.hI, , &a ,..., p&J [diag. [%, z ,..., 
(2-9) 
where 
iso = [w-;‘“.5q , w-pGif2 ,..., wy2i%*]. 
The first operator factor in (2.9) is nonsingular since pi > 0 and the second 
is positive definite since %Jpi > 0 and go*@, > 0; hence L@ is nonsingular. 
While Theorem 1 points out that the nonsingularity of 9 may be main- 
tained in a nontrivial way through w alone the next result shows that 
together W and 4 can play a similar role in the special case where all players 
choose their control variables from the same space. 
THEOREM 2. In the speck1 case where H1 = H2 = --* = H,, let 
L4$ : H1 + H be a bounded linear transformation and pL1 , p2 ,..., p,, be positive 
constants. If 
q = p,&$Yy2 (i = 1, 2,..., n) (2.10) 
then 9 is nonsingular. 
Proof. Using (2.10) in (2.1) we compute 
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where 
The diagonal operators in (2.11) are nonsingular since @:I2 > 0 and pi > 0. 
Therefore the proof will be complete if # is nonsingular. The operator 
matrix # may be rewritten 
i 
(2.12) 
and we note it is sufficient to show the nonsingularity of the operator on the 
left in (2.12). Now to solve 
we compute 
ui = - 9&l, $ wi (i = 1, 2,..., 71 - 1) 
(I+~)u,=u,+u,+...+u,-,+w,. 
Substituting (2.14) into (2.15) we have 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(I+~~+~~+~‘~+~~)u,=w,+w,+~~~+w,. (2.16) 
Since gi>O (i=1,2 ,..., n) the operator (I + *I + @2 + ... + e&l 
exists and is bounded on Hr and we can solve (2.16) for u, . Then (2.14) gives 
us ur , u2 ,..., u,+r and thus the operator in (2.13), and hence 9, is nonsingular. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
We remark that in case Hl , H, ,..., H,, all have the same dimension then 
since they will be isometric they can be taken to be the same. In fact all that 
is required is that the 9Ji have ranges of the same dimension in H. We simply 
replace Hi by the orthogonal complement of the null space of ai and replace 
agi by its restriction to that subspace. 
THEOREM 3. In the special case where Hl = H, = a*. = H,, let 
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B,, : H1 + H be a bounded linear transformation and p1 , p2 ,..., pLn be positive 
constants. If 
WA?. = LSY f42~” e’ I CL2 0 (i = 1, 2,..., n) (2.17) 
then 53 is nonsingular. 
Proof. The preliminary change of variables ui = &;1’2Ci in (1.1) and 
(1.3) produces new operators g’a = gi9’JiJ2, 4!Yi = I and (2.17) becomes 
W@i = /J&30 (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). (2.18) 
Using (2.18) we compute 
= diag./&l, ,LL~I ,..., p,J] +P diag. [$ , -& ,..., &] (2.19) 
where 
and 
g, = ao*ai - % 
Pi 
(i = 1, 2 ,..., n). (2.21) 
From (2.18) and (2.19) we see that Z& > 0 since 6 3 0 and p< > 0. It 
follows by the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 2 that fl is non- 
singular and hence from (2.19) that 9 is nonsingular, which completes the 
proof. 
In order to compare the hypotheses of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 notice 
that when gi > 0 (2.17) may be written as A?i = ~iW’;1~o%~i2. The next 
theorem shows that the playability of the game can be assured by constraining 
the norms of WI, B? and W in accordance with the number of players. 
THEOREM 4. In the general n-player game the decision operator 
53 = 4% + 9?*WB is nonsingular if 
or, in particular, if 
(2.23) 
Proof. Since %i > 0 (i = 1, 2,..., n) we may rewrite ZB as 
.9 = WZ[I + (S&F/2)* w-(LNY-~/2)] WJ2 (2.24) 
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where here I denotes the identity operator on 
H,@H,@-*OH,, &iJz = diag.[%ii2, !?&I2 ,..., @:‘“I 
and %:I2 is the positive definite square root of %!i . Since @iI2 is nonsingular 
it is sufficient to prove that the middle operator factor in (2.24) is nonsingular. 
Using (2.22) we estimate 
(JPd2--1/2)* W(9@-1~2)jl < @iv&l/2)* 11 /Iw” /I 11 ,T!&42-!-1/2 /I 
= II LmP-1’2 II2 II ,%f II < II g II2 II i”y- II II w1j2 II2 
= II 33 II2 II ?Y- II II w-l II < 1. (2.25) 
It follows from (2.25) that [I + (~?&&--l/~)* %‘(LB?-1/2)] is nonsingular and 
hence that L@ is nonsingular. Now to complete the proof of the theorem we 
prove that (2.23) implies (2.22). 
For 
in HI@H2@...@H,, 
(2.26) 
which gives 
II W” II < n312 ,zyn II K II . (2.27) 
Similar elementary estimation shows 
and 
II 42-l II G I~*$ w II . (2.29) 
Then inequality (2.22) follows directly from (2.23), (2.27)-(2.29) and the 
proof of Theorem 4 is complete. 
Finding a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonsingularity of L?@ 
appears to be quite difficult. However the above theorems indicate that it will 
be possible for many types of games to prove that 9 is nonsingular and hence 
that these games are playable. We will make some further remarks about this 
problem in Sections 3 and 4. 
In the next section on stability we will refer to games satisfying the hypo- 
theses of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 as being W-simple, Lhimple and WL#-simple, 
respectively. 
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3. STABILITY 
In this section we will derive sufficient conditions for the stability of our 
linear-quadratic game by studying the operator 9’ given by (1.13). Since 
stability of the game implies its playability these conditions supplement the 
playability results of Section 2. 
THEOREM 5. In the general n-player game if 
II ~8 II2 II W- - dP’7ll II e-l II -=c 1, 
or, in particular, 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
then 119’ II < 1 and the game is stable. 
Proof. Starting with (1.13) and rewriting Y we have 
9 = [92 + iZf* d.(W) a-1 9?*[W - d.(W)] 9 
= 4V-1/2[I + (BW-l/2)* d.(W) (&W-r/s)]-1 W/2~*[W - d.(W)] 9 
(3.3) 
from which we obtain the estimate 
II 3’ II < 11 a II2 II @-l II ll[I + (a@-1’2)* d.(W) (9@-‘I”)]-’ ]I I] W - d.(W)11 
(3.4) 
Using the fact that (G?‘W-1/2)* d.(W) (~~-l~z) > 0 it is a simple matter to 
show that 
ll[I + (LZ%F/~)* d.(W) @W-r’“)]” 11 < 1 (3.5) 
which, when applied to (3.4) gives 
II 9 II d II a II2 II TJT - WYI II 4-l II . (3.6) 
The proof of the first part of the theorem then follows directly from (3.6). 
For 
in Hl@H2@..*@H,, 
I[w - d.(w)] Q I = El 1 $l %uj I2 < il (Fl I @‘h 1)’ 
ifi i#i 
(3.7) 
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from which follows 
II w - dP’3ll B (n - 1) n1/2 Iz,axn I/ -W;. 11 . (3.8) 
We also have the elementary inequalities 
Substituting (3.8)-(3.10) into (3.6) and th en using (3.2) produces the required 
inequality, I/ Y // < 1, and the proof of Theorem 5 is complete. 
THEOREM 6. The 99’-simple game is stable for n = 2. 
Proof. By making a preliminary transformation 
iii = /.@g’:i2tli (i= 1,2) 
we can assume that 
% =a0 and Oi=$ (i= 1,2). 
From (1.13) we then compute 
Y= 
i 
0 [ 
-iI- 
k2 
+ q-l fll 
[ 
-J- + q1 g2 
P22 
0 
1 
where 
@i = @~*wiiq (i = 1, 2). 
Using (3.13) one may easily verify that 
II 9 II2 = II y*y II 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
But *i > 0 (i = 1,2) and from the operational calculus for self-adjoint 
operators 
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1) 6 11 = l.u.b.(A 1 h E o(e)} 
x 
since and ____ 
$+A z 
is monotone increasing for X 3 0. The required inequality I( 9’ /I < 1 then 
follows directly from (3.14) and (3.16) and the proof is complete. 
The following example shows that the H-simple, w-simple and the 
$F%simple game may be unstable if n > 2. 
EXAMPLE 2. We take n = 3, 
H = HI = Hz = Ha = RI, 9?r=L?tJ,,=Bs=?9+Va=~s=l, 
e.21=%2=e2=E>0. 
The decision matrix becomes 
and [cf. (I.1311 we have 
S = 
Then we compute 
1 1 
0 -- 
l+E 1+e 
1 1 
- I 
1+c 
0 
1+E’ 
1 1 -- 
-1$-E 1+c 
0 
(3.17) 
det.(S -AI) = - (A + &-)2 (A - &) 
and we see that the game is unstable if 0 < E < 1. 
(3.18) 
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THEOREM 7. The W-simple game is stable for n = 2. 
Proof. Since % + gB” d.(w) g > 0 is a diagonal operator and pLi > 0 
(i = 1,2) we can make the change of variables 
where 
z?=.Tu 
9 = [(a + a* d.(w) B’> diag. (5, $)11” > 0 (3.20) 
and this produces new operators 
& = &m--J and 4 = y-q&T-1. 
Using (1.13), (2.8) and (3.21) we can easily compute 
9’ = [& + c@* d.(%‘-) @‘I-’ a*[%@- - d.(w)] & 
= g--1g*@-g.y-1 
where 
@=diag.(-$,a)[%@--d.(#‘)]=(& 7) 
and we note that @ and Sp are self-adjoint. 
We now study the resolvent operator for Y which by (3.22) is 
(XI - q-1 = .9-(A99 - ?a*?v-q-19- 
from which we obtain the estimate 
ll(AI - 9)-l 11 < (1 9- 112 p9-2 - ,L4F%?@)-l 11 
Let u = (2) be in H, @ H, and then using (3.20) we get 
04 w- - ~*+-I4 = 2 (Ul , @,u,) + i (u2 , %& 
+ (A - 1) [(Ul > %*%2%%) 
(3.19) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
(24, - [X9- - a*?Pq u) = (- (ul , %,u,) + (- (u2 ,4,u,) 
Pl CL2 
- (A + 1) [(Ul 9 -%*%%ul) (3.26) 
+ (UP 9 %*~~2~2>1 + I %u, + a2u2 l%“o - 
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It follows from (3.25) that 
(4 cw2 - g*@-m u) 3 p1 I l.J 12, h>I (3.27) 
and from (3.26) that 
(24, [AT2 - a*%%q 24) < - p1 1 24 (2, A<--1 (3.28) 
where pr > 0 is the smallest of the numbers 
inf (UiyPy) IUiEHi,IuiI =l] (;=1,2). 
[ 
But u is arbitrary in (3.27), (3.28) and W - W*@9 is self-adjoint, hence 
ll[M-2 - ~‘*%%q-1 I/ < i (3.29) 
which, when applied to (3.24), gives 
Il(A.z - 9)-l II < ‘y s f , IXIbl. 
Since 9 is self-adjoint (3.30) ’ pl rm ies that u(9) C [- 1 + p, 1 - p], hence 
II 9’ 11 < 1 and the stability of the game is established. 
THEOREM 8. The WGY-simple game is stable for ?t = 2. 
Proof. By making the preliminary change of variables u”i = Q.!J~‘~u~ 
(i=1,2)wecantake 
qJi =I 
Pi2 
(i= 1,2) 
and (2.17) becomes 
wp~ = .q (i = 1, 2). 
From (1.13), (3.31) and (3.32) we compute 
0 
Y= 
i 
( 
L- 
t-b= 
+ L&*wlal)-l s?l*wl~2 
i 
-J- 
P22 
+ g2*wg2)-l 912*%?g4?l 0 
) 
0 
= 
i 
( -$ + q % 
( 
-L- + f12.)-l -k”; 
P22 
0 
1 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
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where 
9;: = q*w& >, 0 (i = 1, 2). 
Using (3.33) we further compute 
i 
[( 
$@k = 
0 
from which we obtain the estimate 
(k = 0, 1, 2 )... ). 
Since ?& > 0 we can apply the operational calculus to get 
= IMII ~pi, 
$ 
(i= 1,2) 
+ II % II 
which, when applied to (3.39, gives the result 
II YZk II < PZk (k = 0, 1, 2,...) 
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(3.34) 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
(3.37) 
where p = max[pr , ps] < 1. If I\ 9’ ]I < 1 the stability of the game is clear 
and we therefore suppose I( Y 11 > 1. It then follows from (3.37) that 
II 9” II B P1 II 9 II 3 (K = 1, 2,...). (3.38) 
We are required to prove the convergence of the sequence {a,} defined by 
(1.12). BUt;d,+, - 2ik = Yk(li, - da) and with the aid of (3.38) we have 
I f&+9 - 2, 1 = &Yk+p-l + *** + 9”“) (zil - i&J 
< II 9” II [II 9+-l II + **- + II 9 II + 11 I4 - &I I 
Q pk-l II y II [(P-” + *-- + 1) II 9 II + 11 I 4 - 4 I 
(3.39) 
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(K = 1, 2 ,...; p = 2, 3 ,...) w ic s h h h ows {22,} is a Cauchy sequence. Therefore 
the convergence of {z&J and hence the stability of the game is established. 
4. LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
We are now interested in applying the results of the previous sections to 
the study of a more concrete problem from the field of differential games. This 
problem in the one player case reduces to the optimal regulator problem 
which has been studied extensively in control theory and has had useful 
applications in control engineering [6, 71. 
The data of the problem is given in the form of real matrix-valued functions 
A(t), &(t), lVi(t) 3 0, mi 3 0, vi(t) > 0, and real, finite dimensional 
vector valued functions 7$(t), 9i (i = 1, 2,..., n), all defined and continuous on 
a finite interval t, < t < t, . 
The dynamics of the differential game are given by the linear system 
equation in R” x [t,, , tl] 
(4.1) 
where ui is the m,-dimensional control variable under the command of the 
ith player, Pi . Pi is allowed to play any real, Bore1 measurable control 
command ui = dt) satisfying 
s 
h 
t0 1 q(t)12 at < co. 
With the initial state of the game y(t,) = y,, fixed, any such n-tuple of control 
commands u(t) = (r+(t), u2(t),..., u,(t)) is called an open-Zoop strategy. An 
open-loop strategy together with the solution of (4.1) that it generates will 
be called a pluy of the game. 
Pi determines his cost incurred in a play of the game by a functional of the 
form 
%i = I :, [I y(t) - jqqw*(t) + I Wl2vJt)l dt + I YVl) - ?a I%$ (4.3) 
which he wishes to minimize. 
In order to place this problem into the framework of Section 1 we consider 
the spaces 
I s $1 Lj2 = f(t) : [to , tl] -+ Ri 1 t, lfW2 dt < ~01 (4.4) 
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and rewrite (4.1) using the variation of parameters formula 
y(t) = WY to) Yo 
+ Q(t, 7) [B,(T) q(7) + B,(T) Q-) + *** + &I(4 %I(41 & (4.5) 
where +(T, 7) = I, and $$(t, T) = A(t)#(t, T). We select 
H=Lm2@R*, Hi =L&, (i = 1, 2,..., n) (4.6) 
and define vectors x, x0 ,S$ , ui by 
xi = (‘i’“‘) E H 
Yi 
ui = ui(t) E Hi (i = 1, 2,..., n) 
and operators SYi : Hi -+ H by 
c%%) tt> = 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
(@Pi) Ct> = ui(t) %Ct) (i = 1, 2 )..., n). 
Then (4.3) may be written as 
Therefore with these definitions the differential game given by (4.1), (4.3) is 
equivalent to (l.l), (1.3) and all of the theorems of sections 2 and 3 apply. 
Note that the differential game is Ssimple if 
B<(t) = pJO(t) uy2(t), (i = 1, 2 ,..., n), (4.10) 
409/33/I-8 
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w-simple if 
K(t) = Gut) 
mi=Pi~as (i = 1, 2 ,..., n), 
and ?YB-simple if A(t) commutes with Wi(~), U’i and 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
t2 < t, 7 < tl , (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). Thus we know that the game (4.1), (4.3) is 
playable if either (4.10), (4.11) or (4.12) and the commutativity holds. If, in 
addition, n = 2 then the game is stable. These are, of course, sufficient con- 
ditions only-not necessary conditions. 
We now let [t,, , tl] denote a compact subinterval of some underlying 
interval on which A(t), B,(t), Wi(t) > 0, Us(t) > 0 and yi(t) are defined and 
continuous. With these functions fixed, our next theorem shows that the 
differential game (4. I), (4.3) can always be made playable and stable by 
taking tl - to sufficiently small. 
From (4.8) it is clear that 
and 
II % II2 G pp, II wi(t)l12 + II % II2 -C U3 (4.13) 
01 1 
(4.14) 
As a consequence of (4.13), (4.14) and Theorem 5 we see that to prove “local 
playability” and “local stability” we need only prove 
THEOREM 9. For to , t, bounded 
t>g, II gi II = O9 (i = 1, 2,..., n) (4.15) 
where $6 is defined in (4.8). 
Proof. Let [ta , $1 denote the underlying interval containing the intervals 
[to, tJ. From the continuity of the data it follows that there is a number y 
which gives a bound on the matrix norm 
11 +(t, T> %(T)ll < [(t/3 - tar) +1y2 (4.16) 
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for t, < t, 7 < ts (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). Being careful not to confuse the several 
vector norms involved we compute 
(4.17) 
= y2(t, - to) I ui I21 
whence 
II % II d y(t, - w2 
and from this (4.15) follows. 
(4.18) 
Thus linear-quadratic differential games are always locally playable and 
locally stable. 
We now turn our attention toward the computational aspect of the problem. 
Our local playability result indicates that we should look for a method of 
computing the equilibrium strategy for t, near ti . Let t, be fixed and let t, 
vary. Define a mapping from [0, l] into [t, , tr] by 
7 --f t, + T(t, - to). (4.19) 
Using this mapping the functions f in the space Lj2, originally defined on 
[t,, , tl], can be considered as defined on [0, 11, In this way the spaces H, HI , 
H 2 ,*-et H,, can be taken as fixed spaces, not varying with t, . It is easy to 
check, using (4.8), that the decision operator S@ = S@(t,) is then continuous in 
norm with respect to t, . ZZ+(t,) will be continuous in norm for t, near 2,, 
provided .CF($) exists. Applying this fact to (1.4), (1.8) rewritten in the 
notation of (1.12) 
II % II < &I - w2 
21 = iPl(t,) 93*(&J d.(#‘-(t,)) z, (4.20) 
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where 
we have the following theorem. 
THEOREM 10. Ifs is nonsingular for each to E [ta , tJ, t, jxed, t, < t, , 
then there is a constant K,l such that 
II g-Vo)ll < Koll, to E [ta ,hl (4.22) 
and hence further constants Ko12, Kw3 such that 
and 
Ial <Kx21fl (4.23) 
U,(d) < Km3 1 5 I2 (i = 1, 2,..., n) for all y. E R”, to E [t, , tI]. 
(4.24) 
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the remarks preceding 
Theorem 10 and continuity considerations. 
Differential games satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 10 in which it is 
required that S@(t,) b e nonsingular for all to in an interval (tiY , tl] and not 
just at one point will be called playable on the interval (t, , tl]. We note that 
if the data matrices of the game and yi(t) are defined on (- co, tl] and the 
differential game is a-simple, #‘--simple or ?YB’-simple there, then it is 
playable on each interval (ta , tJ and hence (4.24) will hold for all t, < tl 
although of course we may have some or all of the Kai tending to 00 as t, 
tends to - co. 
Thus far our only means for computing the equilibrium strategy of a 
playable game, (4.20), is a rather unsatisfactory one since it involves the 
abstract operator CP1(to). Fortunately, the feedback synthesis procedure 
which we are about to develop provides a simple method for computing the 
strategy from the instantaneous state of the game. We shall see shortly that 
the main computation involves the integration of a system of ordinary dif- 
ferential equations, [(4&I), (4.46)], depending upon only the data of the 
problem. 
As a notational convenience we define, in terms of the given matrices 
l&(t), Ui(t) > 0, additional matrix functions 
q(t) = E&(t) U;l(t) B,*(t) 2 0 (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). (4.25) 
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The feedback synthesis which we now develop is suggested by the maximum 
principle and Hamilton- Jacobi formalisms which were applied in [6] to study 
the regulator control problem. 
Our basic assumption is that the differential game (4.1), (4.3) is playable 
on a fixed interval (ta , tI]. We proved in the above sections that for each 
t, E (t, , tr], y,, E Rm there exists a unique equilibrium strategy fi = zi(t, y,, , ta) 
for the differential game on [to , tJ with initial state j(t,, , y,, , to) = y,, . From 
the uniqueness it is clear that zI, 9 have the important semi-group property 
(4.26) 
holding for ally0 E R m, t, < to < t, < t < t, . For the purpose of ultimately 
constructing the equilibrium strategy from the solutions of differential 
equations we define Hamiltonian functions 
Hi = Jti + A(t) Y f B,(t) ui + i B,(t) f&(t, YO 9 to) * I: 
j=l 1 
(4.27) 
+ I Y -7i /2Wi(t) + I % 12vi(t) (i = 1, 2,..., n) 
and by formally setting HIi = 0, Hi = 0 are led to considering the system of 
Hamilton- Jacobi partial differential equations in the dependent variables 
Ji = Ji(Y, t> Yo 9 to) 
J: + [ WY - 47 W) 1: + $ W) w, yo , to)] * J,i 
+ I Y - ~iW&t) + t I Ai I%&) = 09 y E II”, a.e. t E (to 7 4 
Ji(Y,tl,YO,tO)=IY-~iIb,, PER” (i = 1, 2 )..., n). 
(4.28) 
As a preliminary step in proving (4.28) h as a solution we make a formal separa- 
tion of variables in (4.28) 
Ji = Y . Qty + 2~ . qi + ci (4.29) 
where Qi = Pi(t) is a symmetric m x m matrix function, qi = qi(t, y. , to) is 
an m-dimensional vector function and ci = c,(t, y. , to) is a scalar function 
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(i = 1, 2,..., n), all to be determined so that (4.29) satisfies (4.28). This gives 
rise to the system of ordinary differential equations 
- !i?i = W(t) + A *@I Qi + Qi4) - Qi &(t) Qj , 
Qj(tl) = ?& , (i = 1, 2 ,..., n); 
(4.30) 
- 4 = W*(t) - Qi W)l qi + Qi j$I W) W, YO 9 toI - wit4 M), 
fi 
4&l ,Yo P to) = - %9t 9 (i = 1, 2,..., n); 
(4.31) 
- 4 = I H0lBW,(t) - I qi l&(t) + at * i m WY0 9 to), 
j-1 
ff 
(4.32) 
41 , Yo , to) = I 95 I%$ > (i = 1, 2 )..., n). 
Equation (4.30) is the well-known Kalman-Riccati matrix differential equa- 
tion. This nonlinear equation has a solution Q(t) > 0 on [&, , tr]. This may be 
verified by applying the inequality 
- Bj < Wj(t) + A*(t) Qj + &,A@), (i = 1, 2 ,..., n) (4.33) 
to extend the local solution of (4.30) about t = tr to [t, , tr] or by referring to 
[6]. Of course (4.31), (4.32) then also have solutions on [t,, , trj and we 
substitute these solutions into (4.29) to obtain a solution to (4.28). 
For the time being we fix i ~(1, 2,..., n}. Select arbitrary tz E [to , tr], 
ui = ui(t) EL&Jz,, tr] and let r(t) denote the solution of 
9 = A(Qy + 4(t) %@) +i w> w, Yo 9 to) (4.34) 
j-1 
fi 
on [tz , tJ for which Y(&) = yz = j(tz , y. , to). By differentiation, using 
(4.28), (4.34), one can easily verify the equation 
s 
t1 =- 1 h(T) + ii u?(T) &*(T) kb(T), T, yo 9 to>l”,,(d &. (4.35) 
t-2 
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From (4.35) we conclude that 
+ I YW - 54 I& 
for all ui EL~,[& , ti]. Moreover, if we let y(t) denote the solution of 
P = 49 - 4 w JAY, 4 Yo , to) + i B,(t) w, Yo , to) (4.37) 
id 
#i 
for which y(t,) = ya it follows immediately from (4.34)-(4.36) that the control 
function 
%(t) = - g W(t) B,*(t) J&(t), 4 yo , to) (4.38) 
is the unique control in L%,[t2 , tl] minimizing the cost functional defined by 
(4.34) and the right side of (4.36). By (4.26) and the definition of an equilibrium 
strategy the restriction of f&(t, y. , to) to [ta , tl] minimizes the same cost 
functional. Hence z&(t) = z&(t, y. , to) on [t2 , tlJ and y(t) = P(t, y. , to) there. 
Initially i E (1, 2,..., n} was arbitrary and therefore our above conclusions 
hold for i = 1,2,..., ?t. Furthermore, from (4.35), (4.37), (4.38) and the fact 
that i&(t) = t’&(t, y. , to) on [t2 , tl] we see that J*(yz , t, , y. , to) (i = 1, 2 ,..., n) 
are the costs of G(t, y. , to) on [t2 , t;] with j(t, , y. , to) = y2 . Finally we 
note that the solution Ji(y, t, y. , to) (i = 1,2,..., n) of (4.28) defined by 
(4.29)-(4.32) is unique for otherwise we could repeat the above argument to 
contradict the fact that the costs of 22 are given by the Ji. We summarize 
these results in the next theorem. 
THEOREM 11. For a differential game (4.1), (4.3) which is playable on 
(tll, tI] there exists a unique solution to (4.28), Ji = Ji(y, t, y. , to) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n), dejined for all to E (ta, tJ, y. E R”, t E [to, tJ, y E R”. This 
solution is related to the equilibrium strategy and trajectory functions 
zi = ti(t, y. , to), 9 = $(t, y. , to), respectiwely, by the equations 
9 = A(t)9 - 4 i Q(t) Jj(9, 4 yo , to), 
j=l 
9tto , Yo , to) = Yo 
(4.39) 
qt, yo , to) = - 4 W(t) B,*(t) J&J 6 Yo , to) (4.40) 
=- 4 U?(t) &“@) Ji(Y> t, 9, t)l,=p 
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J”(A t, YO 9 to) = j:’ [I 8(7> yo 3 to) - %.i(%-J,, + I UT, Y,, , to)l?~,d dT 
(4.41) 
+19(tl~YoJo)-9rl~i, (i = 1, 2 ,..., 72). 
Proof. We consider the second equality in (4.40), which is the only part of 
Theorem 11 not already proved. If we examine (4.29)-(4.32) to see how the 
/i(y, t, y. , to) were constructed and apply the semi-group property of Ei given 
in (4.26) then we see that 
Ji(Y7 4 Yo > to) = Y’(Y9 4 Jv, Yo , to), t> (4.42) 
for each t E [to, ti] and all y E R m. Differentiating both sides of (4.42) with 
respect to y and evaluating these derivatives at y = j(t, ys , to) we have 
JW t, Yo , to) = Jyi(Y, t, 9, t)ly=P (4.43) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n) and the proof is complete. 
The significance of equations (4.39)-(4.40) is that they show the open-loop 
equilibrium strategies can be “synthesized by feedback control functions.” 
That is, at each time t E (t oL , tl] and state of the game y E R” the instantane- 
ous value of il is determined by t, y according to the second equality in (4.40) 
and no memory involving past states of the game nor prediction of future 
states is required for the computation. Consequently, in Theorem 12 we shall 
denote the equilibrium strategy as a function of t, y by d(t, y). 
Of course although Theorem 11 tells us that a feedback synthesis is possible, 
it does not tell us directly how to compute it since the technique that we 
used to construct the Ji involved the future values of zi. The next theorem 
provides a method for constructing the feedback control function tz(t, y) 
directly from the data of the problem. 
THEOREM 12. For a dzyerential game (4.1), (4.3) which is playable on 
(ta , tl] there exists a solution on (t oL , tJ to the m x m matrix dz$jGrential equa- 
tions 
-Li = wi(t) + A*(t)Li + L,A(t) - Li 5 Dj(t)Lj 
j=l 
Li(tl) = @i 7 (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). (444) 
At each time t E (to: , tJ and state of the game y E Rm the equilibrium strategy 
function zl(t, y) can be computed by 
w, Y> = - W(t) B,“(t) L(t) Y + r,(t)1 (4.45) 
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(i = 1, 2,..., n) where the ri(t) are the solutions to the linear vector di@rential 
equations 
ii = - A*(t) Ti + Li(t) i Uj(t) rj + FVi(t)yi(t), 
i=l 
Yi( tJ = - wi & , (i = 1, 2,:.., n); 
(4.46) 
hence, (4.45) provides the feedback synthesis for the game. 
Proof. From (4.29), (4.31), (4.39) and (4.40) we have the solution 
Ji(y, t, y. , to) (i = 1, 2 ,..., n) to (4.28) given by 
Ji(Y, t, yo , to) = y * Qdt) y + 2y * q& yo , to) + c& yo , to) (4.47) 
and hence the formula 
W> yo 9 to) = - u?(t) &*(t> [Qi(t> P(t> YO 9 to> + qi(t, yo > to)1 (4.48) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n) where the qi(t, y. , to) are defined by (4.31). Furthermore 
96 y. , to) and q&, y. , to) (i = 1, Z..., n) provide a solution to the boundary 
value problem for the system in Rcnz+iJn 
3 = 
[ 
40 - jgl o&J Q,(t) Y - f 7$(t) qi 1 j=l (4.49) 
Pi = Qdt> j$l udt> Qdt> Y - A*(t) qi + Pi(t) i udt) qj + Wdt> Tdt) 
j=l fi 
(4.50) 
corresponding to the boundary conditions y = y. at t = to and qi = - Wi ji 
at t = t, , (i = I, 2 ,..., n). 
Let y = y(t, yl), qi = qi(t) (i = 1, 2 ,..., n) be the solution of (4.49), (4.50) 
for the final value problem y(tl , yi) = yi , qi(tJ = - Wiii , yi arbitrary in 
Rm. From the fact that there is a solution to the previously mentioned 
boundary value problem it is clear that the map y1 -+ y(t,, , yl) of Rm into 
itself is surjective. By writing y(t, yr), qi(t) in terms of a system of funda- 
mental solutions for (4.49) (4.50) it follows that there are matrix functions 
Ri(to) and vector functions ri(to) such that 
qi(to) = Wo) y(to j yl) + ri(to) 
In particular, 
for 
qa(t> yo 7 to> = Wt) $(t, yo 7 to) + r&> (4.51) 
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for all t,, E (t= , &I, t E [t, , t,J, JJ,-, E Rm (i = 1, 2 ,..., n). One may use (4.51) 
to verify R,(t), rr(t) satisfy the equations 
&(G) = 0, (i = 1, 2,..., n); 
+ Qdtll, (4.52) 
n 
fi = - A*(t) YI + PC(t) + Q&)1 c OAt> r, + K(t) %(t), 
j=l 
Y&l) = - *gi , (i = 1, 2 )..., n). 
(4.53) 
By adding equations (4.52), (4.30) and defining Lj(t) = Rd(t) + Qi(t) we 
see that Li satisfies (4.44) and (4.53) b ecomes (4.46). The proof is completed 
by applying (4.48), (4.51) and the definition of Lj(t) to compute 
4 = - u?(t) &*(t) [Qi(t) 9+ pi@, yo , to)] 
(4.54) 
= - up(t) B,*(t) [Lj(t)p + y,(t)]. 
Our theory says that equilibrium will be played automatically whenever all 
players apply feedback control zi(t, y). Furthermore, player Pi will suffer an 
increase in cost if he departs from equilibrium while the remaining n - 1 
players continue to play their open-loop equilibrium strategies. However if 
Pi departs from equilibrium with the other players playing feedback then we 
might suspect that the feedbacks react to increase Pi’s cost. In general this is 
not the case. In Reference [2] linear feedback controls with this “closed-loop 
equilibrium” property are shown to exist over sufficiently short time intervals. 
They do not produce control signals which are equilibrium strategies in the 
sense in which we have defined them. 
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